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DIVISIBILITY OF ADVANCED DEGREES IN NORTH
CAROLINA-AN EXAMINATION AND PROPOSAL
BUDDY O.H. HERRING*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981 North Carolina joined the growing list of states' that have
adopted an equitable distribution scheme for dividing marital property.
One issue subject to much litigation in equitable distribution states is
whether an advanced degree earned during marriage is a proper subject
for equitable distribution.2 The North Carolina statute does not deal
with the subject of advanced degrees directly, but states that professional
and business licenses are to be treated as separate property.
3
The treatment of advanced degrees becomes especially troublesome
when the divorce occurs shortly after the advanced degree is obtained.
Often one spouse has given up advanced educational opportunities or
lucrative employment opportunities to relocate with the student spouse,
and has devoted all of his or her efforts to finance the educational and
living expenses of the family. Since all the couple's resources are devoted
to the educational endeavor, no other assets are accumulated. Thus,
when the marriage ends, the only "marital asset" is the advanced degree
obtained by the student spouse. The question then arises whether that
degree is a proper subject for division under equitable distribution law.
Because North Carolina has not dealt directly with the subject of ad-
vanced degrees in its equitable distribution statute, the question becomes
whether North Carolina courts will interpret the statute broadly to in-
clude the degree, as well as the license, as separate property. The statute
clearly distinguishes between the education and the license.
4
Property division is of even greater importance now that most states
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law; Visiting Professor, Pepperdine
University School of Law.
1. States which have adopted equitable distribution statutes are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
2. See Report of Conference on "New Developments in Family Law and Practice," 9 FAm. L.
RPi. (BNA) 2041, 2042 (Nov. 16, 1982).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984).
4. See id. § 50-20(b)(2), (c)(7).
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have abolished fault grounds for alimony, or have restricted alimony to
those cases in which the spouse requesting alimony is clearly a dependent
spouse. Frequently, the non-student spouse is not a dependent spouse
and would not qualify for alimony. Also, in most instances, the only
"asset" the couple has acquired during the marriage is the advanced de-
gree. Thus, North Carolina's allocation5 to the non-student spouse of a
greater share of the marital property for his or her contribution to the
education of the student spouse is meaningless.
This article examines how other states with equitable distribution laws
have treated advanced degrees upon divorce, and proposes the best way
for North Carolina to handle advanced degrees upon dissolution of a
marriage. No attempt will be made to examine the divisibility of the
practice which the degree-holding spouse develops as a result of the i-
cense he holds.6
II. How THE STATES TREAT THE ADVANCED DEGREE-AN
OVERVIEW
Most equitable distribution statutes do not deal directly with the sub-
ject of the advanced degree. Those that do are usually similar to North
Carolina's statute and either deal only with the resulting license or prac-
tice, or consider the contribution made by a spouse to the other's educa-
tion as a factor in the division of the marital property.' Indiana' and
California,9 for example, have dealt specifically with advanced degrees in
their equitable distribution statutes. The Indiana statute provides that if
there is little or no marital property to be divided, then the non-degree
earning spouse may receive an award for his or her financial contribution
to the education of the other spouse.10 Where the statutes do not specifi-
cally address the divisibility of the degree, courts have had to decide
whether an advanced degree is a proper subject for equitable distribution.
While many of the cases dealing with this matter are settled before trial,
an increasing number are making their way not only to trial, but to the
appellate court level.1
There is no uniformity in the judicial treatment of the divisibility of
the advanced degree. The state courts' treatment of the issue may be
divided into four distinct categories. First are the courts which hold that
5. Id. § 50-20(c)(7).
6. See In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1980); Heller v. Heller,
672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. App. 1984); Litman v. Litman, 115 Misc. 2d 230, 453 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1982),
rev'd, 93 A.D.2d 695, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
7. Eg., IOWA CODE § 598.21(e) (1981).
8. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Bums 1980).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800.3, 4801(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1985).
10. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Burns 1980).
11. Lauter, lhose Law Degree Is It?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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advanced degrees are not property within the meaning of their states'
equitable distribution statute and therefore not subject to any type of di-
vision.12 Second are the courts which hold that, even if the advanced
degree is property within the meaning of the equitable distribution stat-
utes, the valuation problems are so difficult and speculative as to prohibit
division. 3 Third are the courts which hold that the degree is not prop-
erty, but award the non-degree spouse reimbursement for financial con-
tributions to the obtaining of the degree. 4 Fourth are the courts which
hold the degree to be property subject to division under state equitable
distribution statutes. 5 In this final category, there is a split of authority
as to how to value the property, but division is allowed. 6 A more thor-
ough evaluation of the merits and pitfalls of each theory follows for the
purpose of proposing the best course for North Carolina.
III. COURTS WHICH HOLD THAT ADVANCED DEGREES ARE NOT
PROPERTY WITHIN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STATUTES
AND THEREFORE ARE NOT SUBJECT To
DIVISION UPON DIVORCE
In re Marriage of Graham"7 is the leading case for the view that an
advanced degree is not property under the equitable distribution statute
and therefore not subject to division upon divorce. Addressing the spe-
cific issue of whether an advanced degree is property within the meaning
of the equitable distribution act, the Colorado Supreme Court, in a 4-3
decision, held that the degree was not property. The court reasoned that:
[a]n educational degree . . . is simply not encompassed even by the
broad views of the concept of "property." It does not have an exchange
value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is per-
sonal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inher-
itable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An
advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous edu-
cation, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired
by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achieve-
ment that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of
that term.
18
The court noted that the non-degree-holding spouse was not without
remedy, and specifically permitted lower courts to consider the contribu-
tion of the non-degree spouse to the education of the other spouse in
12. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
13. Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
14. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
15. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 S.W.2d 332 (1983).
16. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1982).
17. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
18. Id. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77.
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dividing the couple's marital property.19 Also, where maintenance was
sought and need demonstrated, the non-degree spouse's contribution to
the education of the other spouse would be a relevant factor in setting the
award.2' The fact that the wife sought no maintenance and that there
was no other marital property to be divided should not lead a court to
disregard the usual meaning of the term "property" and subject the ad-
vanced degree of the husband to division.
A number of courts have followed the rationale in Graham and have
held that the advanced degree is not property and therefore not subject to
division under the equitable distribution law.21 In addition, most com-
munity property states generally agree with the Graham rationale. In
Wisner v. Wisner,22 an Arizona opinion, the court defined an education
as an intangible property right, the value of which cannot be properly
characterized as property subject to division.23
In California, an influential community property state, courts hold
that an advanced degree is not property subject to division. In Todd v.
Todd,24 the California appellate court held that a professional degree was
"[a]t best. . . an intangible property right, the value of which, because
of its character, cannot have a monetary value placed upon it for division
between spouses."25
Another reason state courts have been reluctant to hold that an ad-
vanced degree is property subject to division was advanced by the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals in In re Marriage ofAufmuth,26 where the court
observed that valuing a professional degree as an asset in the marital
estate would necessarily require a division of the post-divorce earnings
and efforts of the degree-holder. Such a result would be inconsistent with
the philosophy that only assets acquired during the marriage are subject
to division.
The Aufinuth rationale is not limited to community property states.
19. Id. at 433, 574 P.2d at 78.
20. Id.
21. See In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); In re Mar-
riage of McManama, 272 Ind. 483, 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661,
365 N.E.2d 792 (1977); Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733 (1983); Lesman v. Lesman,
110 Misc. 2d 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1981).
22. 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
23. Id. at 340, 631 P.2d at 122; see also Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357
(1972).
24. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
25. Id. at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135. However, the California Family Law Act has recently been
amended to provide for reimbursement of "community contributions to education or training of a
party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party." CAL. CIVIL CODE
§ 4800.3(b)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1985). Pursuant to that amendment, the California Supreme
Court reversed a trial court denial of compensation for contributions to education. In re Marriage of
Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 354 (1984).
26. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
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In Mahoney v. Mahoney,2 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that,
even giving the term "property" an "expansive interpretation" would not
allow the court to characterize an advanced degree as property.28 The
court stated that to subject the degree to distribution would, in effect,
require the distribution of future earnings, violating the principle of the
equitable distribution law that only property acquired during the mar-
riage is subject to distribution. Future earnings which result from an
advanced degree are really property acquired after the marriage. The
New Jersey court was also concerned about the speculative nature of
such an award.29 Valuation problems, as set forth in Mahoney, are such
frequent concerns that courts really do not decide the issue of whether or
not the degree is property, but deny division based on the valuation
problems alone.
IV. COURTS WHICH Do NOT ALLOW DISTRIBUTION OF ADVANCED
DEGREES PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF VALUATION PROBLEMS
As noted in the previous section, many courts which have confronted
the problem of the divisibility of advanced degrees are troubled with the
problem of valuation.30 These courts pinpoint the crux of the problem as
not whether the degree is property which can be divided, but if divided,
how it should be valued so as not, in effect, to divide future earnings.
In Hughes v. Hughes,3 a Florida appellate court stated that if the edu-
cational degree is property to be divided, the proper measure of its value
must be calculated by the possible future earnings it would generate and
not by its cost. The court then concluded that such measure of value was
just too imprecise, uncertain, and speculative to provide the basis for an
award.32 The court was not as concerned with whether or not the degree
was property as with the degree's value.
The valuation problem often plays an important role in a court's deci-
sion that the degree is not property, because the court often reasons that
any valuation of the degree must be tied to the future earnings which it
will generate. "[T]he value of a professional degree for purposes of prop-
erty distribution is nothing more than the possibility of enhanced earn-
ings that the particular academic credential will provide. '33 To value an
27. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
28. Id. at 495-96, 453 A.2d at 531.
29. Id. at 466-69, 453 A.2d at 532-33; accord Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 IM. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); In re Mar-
riage of McManama, 272 Ind. 483, 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296
N.W.2d 761 (1980).
30. See cases cited supra note 29.
31. 438 So. 2d 146 (Fha Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
32. Id. at 146.
33. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 496-97, 453 A.2d at 532.
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asset in this manner is highly speculative. As the court pointed out in
DeWitt v. DeWitt:
[w]hether a professional education is and will be of future value to its
recipient is a matter resting on factors which are at best difficult to antici-
pate or measure. A person qualified by education for a given profession
may choose not to practice it, may fail at it, or may practice in a special-
ity, location or manner which generates less than average income enjoyed
by fellow professionals. The potential worth of the education may never
be realized for these or many other reasons. An award based on the pre-
diction of the degree holder's success at the chosen field may bear no
relationship to the reality he or she faces after divorce.34
As the court stated in Mahoney, "valuing a professional degree in the
hands of any particular individual at the start of his or her career would
involve a gamut of calculations that reduces to little more than
guesswork.
'35
In addition to the speculative nature of such a valuation, there were
two other valuation problems troubling the Mahoney court. First was
the problem that any award based on future earnings would amount to
dividing assets which were acquired after the marriage terminated,36
although equitable distribution statutes only provide for division of prop-
erty acquired during the marriage.37 Thus, by making an award based
on future earnings, a court would be making an award of property not
the subject of the equitable distribution act.38 The second problem was
the fact that a property division, unlike an alimony award, is not modifia-
ble.3 9 If the degree holder failed to live up to the court's expectations,
the finality of the property distribution precluded a remedy.' Thus, the
likelihood was increased that a particular equitable distribution would
prove unfair if the court miscalculated the value of the degree. As the
court stated in DeWitt, "[t]he potential for inequity to the failed profes-
sional or one who changes careers is at once apparent; his or her spouse
will have been awarded a share of something which never existed in any
real sense."'"
In the normal equitable distribution award, a court divides property
which exists in some form or another. Once the court decides how the
division shall take place, the property is transferred. Even in the case of
a distributive award, there is usually other property awarded to the
34. Deuitt, 98 Wis. 2d at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768; see also Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 498,453 A.2d at
532.
35. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 498, 453 A.2d at 532.
36. Id ; DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d at 59 n.17, 296 N.W.2d at 768 n.17.
37. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1), (c) (1984).
38. Hughes, 438 So. 2d at 150.
39. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
40. Hughes, 438 So. 2d at 58; see also In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d
1314 (1980).
41. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
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spouse which can then be sold to comply with the distributive award.
Here, if future earnings are divided, they still must be earned.
Even if a party can convince a court that the degree is property, any
decision requires resolution of the valuation problems outlined above.
Because of these problems, the majority of jurisdictions do not allow the
advanced degree to be divided in an equitable distribution action. How-
ever, a significant minority of state courts have either overcome these
arguments or have simply found that equity must provide a means of
dealing with the inequities present in the situation.
V. COURTS WHICH Do NOT TREAT THE ADVANCED DEGREE AS
MARITAL PROPERTY, BUT Do ALLOW THE NON-DEGREE
SPOUSE COMPENSATION BASED ON EQUITABLE
PRINCIPLES
While the majority of courts have denied recovery to a non-degree
spouse, a few jurisdictions have followed equitable principles rather than
strictly interpreting the common law to find a means of making some
award to the spouse who has contributed to the degree by supporting the
family while the other spouse attended school. These awards have usu-
ally been based on some theory of restitution or unjust enrichment. The
measure of award has varied from one state to another; in most cases,
courts have professed to be seeking justice between the parties, and not to
be awarding an equitable distribution of marital property.
In Mahoney, the court expressly stated that the husband's advanced
degree was not viewed as marital property subject to division under New
Jersey law, but that it would be unfair not to "do something" to aid the
wife who had supported the family while the husband was pursuing a
master's degree in business administration. The court stated that:
[i]n this case, the supporting spouse made financial contributions toward
her husband's professional education with the expectation that both par-
ties would enjoy material benefits flowing from the professional license or
degree. It is therefore patently unfair that the supporting spouse be de-
nied the mutually anticipated benefit while the supported spouse keeps
not only the degree, but also all of the financial and material rewards
flowing from it. .. . In effect, through her contributions, the supporting
spouse has consented to live at a lower material level while her husband
has prepared for another career. . . . The supporting spouse's sacrifices
would have been rewarded had the marriage endured and the mutual
expectations of both of them been fulfilled. The unredressed sacrifices-
loss of support and reduction of the standard of living--coupled with the
unfairness attendant upon the defeat of the supporting spouse's shared
expectation of future advantages, further justify a remedial reward.42
42. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500-01, 453 A.2d at 533-34.
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In Mahoney, the court was concerned with finding a way to compen-
sate the non-degree-earning spouse even though it found that the degree
earned during the marriage was not property.43 The court suggested nu-
merous methods for making this "remedial reward." The Mahoney court
introduced the concept of reimbursement alimony, 4 noting that such an
award:
properly accords with the Court's belief that regardless of the appropri-
ateness of permanent alimony or the presence or absence of marital prop-
erty to be equitably distributed, there will be circumstances where a
supporting spouse should be reimbursed for the financial contributions he
or she made to the spouse's successful professional training. Such reim-
bursement alimony should cover all financial contributions towards the
former spouse's education, including household expenses, educational
costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions used by the sup-
ported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license.45
The court clearly indicated that this was an equitable remedy, not to be
applied in all cases.46 Rather, the remedy was especially designed for
situations where a "young professional who after being supported
through graduate school leaves his mate for greener pastures [because]
[o]ne spouse ought not to receive a divorce complaint when the other
receives a diploma."'47 In other cases different remedies may be more
appropriate. The Mahoney court mentioned "rehabilitative alimony"
and an unequal equitable distribution as possible alternatives.48 The im-
portant consideration was that a method be found which promotes
equity.
[W~here a spouse has received from his or her partner financial contribu-
tions used in obtaining a professional degree or license with the expecta-
tion of deriving material benefits for both marriage partners, that spouse
may be called upon to reimburse the supporting spouse for the amount of
contributions received. 49
The court did not specifically say whether an award of "reimbursement
alimony" would be modifiable or adjustable because of changed circum-
stances,50 and would presumably also wait to decide the effect of remar-
riage on the award.
43. Id. at 498-99, 453 A.2d at 532; see also In re Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152
(1984).
44. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534. See also Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354
N.W.2d 359 (1984).
45. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 502, 453 A.2d at 535.
47. Id. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
48. Id. at 504, 453 A.2d at 535; see also Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.
1984).
49. Mahoney, 91 NJ. at 505, 453 A.2d at 536.
50. Id. at 503 n.5, 453 A.2d at 535 n.5. The court failed to mention tax implications of such an
award.
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Other courts have not deemed it necessary to resort to the creation of a
new class of remedy to make an award. In Hubbard v. Hubbard,"1 the
Oklahoma court faced a situation similar to that addressed by the court
in Mahoney. A doctor was divorcing his wife of twelve years when he
was "on the threshold of a successful professional life." The court agreed
with Graham "that Dr. Hubbard's license to practice was his own to do
with as he pleases," but that his decision did not preclude Ms. Hubbard
"from receiving an award in lieu of property division."52 The court
stated that it would base the award on "equity and natural justice.
5 3
To hold otherwise would result in the unjust enrichment of Dr. Hubbard.
He would leave the marriage with an earning capacity increased by
$250,000 which was obtained in substantial measure through the efforts
and sacrifices of his wife. She on the other hand, would leave the mar-
riage without either a return on her investment or an earning capacity
similarly increased through joint efforts. Without her direct and indirect
contributions to his education, training and support, Dr. Hubbard would
have been forced to either prolong his education or go deeply in debt.54
The Hubbard court determined that because all the resources of the
marriage had been devoted to the husband's education, the couple had
few conventional assets to divide at the time of divorce. "There is no
reason in law or equity why Dr. Hubbard should retain the only valuable
asset which was accumulated through joint efforts."' "5 The court refused
to be "rendered impotent" in such a situation because of a narrow defini-
tion of "property. ' 56 It also rejected the idea that Ms. Hubbard be lim-
ited to alimony for support and maintenance. The court's reasoning was
that such an award "would force her to forego remarriage and perhaps
even be celibate for many years simply to realize a return on her invest-
ment and sacrifices of the past twelve years."
'57
The Oklahoma court opted instead to follow the dissenting opinion in
Graham, and turned to the doctrine of quasi contract, reasoning "that
Ms. Hubbard has the right to be compensated for the amount of her
investment in Dr. Hubbard's education and training to prevent his unjust
enrichment."5" The measure of the award was to be based on her contri-
bution to his "direct support and school and professional training ex-
penses, plus reasonable interests and adjustments for inflation." 59
51. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
52. Id. at 750.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 750-51. But see Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 175-76, 677 P.2d at 157 (criticizing use
of unjust enrichment theory as basis for an award).
55. Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 751.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 752.
58. Id. at 751.
59. Id.
9
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However, the decision was limited to the facts of the case; because this
remedy was an equitable one, different facts might warrant a different
result.6°
Several other jurisdictions have allowed a recovery by the non-degree-
earning spouse even though they were unwilling to characterize the de-
gree as property.' In all of these cases the courts were motivated by
equitable considerations. In DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa,62 the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated, "[one] spouse has foregone the immediate enjoy-
ment of earned income to enable the other to pursue an advanced educa-
tion on a full-time basis. Typically, this sacrifice is made with the
expectation that the parties will enjoy a higher standard of living in the
future."63 To allow the degree-earning spouse to then walk away with all
the benefits of the degree which resulted from joint effort was held to be
unconscionable.
Even courts which have adopted the view that the advanced degree is
property cite the equitable argument with approval. In Inman v,. In-
man,' the Kentucky Supreme Court, in dictum, stated that, although an
advanced degree was not marital property, the non-degree spouse was
entitled to compensation for his or her contribution. The compensation
should be measured by the non-degree spouse's contribution to the de-
gree and the future earning capacity of the degree-holding spouse. The
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the "law of the case" doctrine pro-
hibited the court of appeals from reversing its earlier ruling65 should the
issue remain the same on a second appeal.66 Although the supreme
court's statements concerning advanced degrees are dicta, they indicate a
possible change in Kentucky's treatment of advanced degrees. Appellate
level courts probably will not treat the advanced degree as marital prop-
erty, but will instead make some sort of equitable award.
The obvious limitation to the "natural justice" approach to the divi-
sion of advanced degrees is that its availability depends solely on the eq-
uity powers of the court. Many of the decisions limit the remedy allowed
to the particular facts of the case. The theory presupposes enormous
amounts of discretion in the trial judge, and the decisions fail to define
the legal ramifications of some of these remedies. For exampJe, in Maho-
ney, the court left unanswered the issue of how the status of a reimburse-
ment alimony award would be affected by modification or adjustment.67
60. Id.
61. Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309
N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
62. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
63. Id. at 758.
64. Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 849-52 (Ky. 1982).
65. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979), rev'd, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982).
66. Inman, 648 S.W.2d at 849.
67. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 503 n.5, 453 A.2d at 535 n.5.
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Rather than assume responsibility for this type of uncertainty or risk
the creation of a new type of relief, some courts have simply decided that
the advanced degree is property, and thus can be divided under an equi-
table distribution statute.
VI. COURTS WHICH HOLD THE ADVANCED DEGREE OR THE
FUTURE EARNINGS IT WILL GENERATE TO BE MARITAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DIVISION
The first case to recognize that the non-degree-earning spouse had a
legal, as opposed to an equitable, claim to the earned degree or generated
future earnings was In re Marriage of Horstmann.68 In Horstmann, the
Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the Colorado Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Graham that the advanced degree was not itself property, but held
the potential for increased future earning capacity to be an asset eligible
for distribution by the court.69 The court therefore affirmed the lower
court's award of an $18,000 property division to Ms. Horstmann.
Although the court stated that the advanced degree was not property and
only future earnings were subject to division, the basis of its award was
the cost of obtaining the degree.7 ° There was no effort made to determine
what the future earnings might be. Thus, while the court stated it was
dividing the future earnings, apparently it was dividing the degree, using
the cost of obtaining it as its value.
Inman v. Inman was the first case which actually held that an ad-
vanced degree was property subject to division under an equitable distri-
bution statute.71 While the Kentucky Court of Appeals admitted it had
strong reservations about declaring a professional degree to be marital
property, such a conclusion was necessary to achieve a just result.72 The
court said "that the best measure of a spouse's interest in such a degree
should be measured by his or her monetary investment in the degree.
' 73
That investment would be determined by the amount each spouse spent
in obtaining the degree.74 Although the Kentucky Supreme Court, in
dictum, indicated that it may not agree with the conclusion that the de-
gree is marital property, only the reasoning of the court in setting an
award might be affected, and not its amount.75
In two recent cases, courts have declared an advanced degree to be
property subject to division and the value of that degree to be measured
68. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
69. Id. at 891.
70. Id.
71. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979), rev'd, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982).
72. Id. at 268.
73. Id. at 269.
74. Id. at 270-71.
75. Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982). The Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
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by the amount of future earnings it will generate.76 In Woodworth v.
Woodworth,7" the court stated that it would not be bound by traditional
definitions of property but was more "concerned with how best to dis-
tribute between the parties what they have once the marriage has for all
intents and purposes dissolved."17 8 Here both parties contributed to the
earning of the degree and it was viewed as marital property. The court
then rejected the argument that valuation problems are so great as to
preclude consideration of advanced degrees as marital property.79
[Fluture earnings due to an advanced degree are not "too speculative."
While a degree holder spouse might change professions, earn less than
projected at trial, or even die, courts have proved adept at measuring
future earnings in such contexts as personal injury, wrongful death, and
worker's compensation actions. In fact, pain and suffering, professional
goodwill and mental distress, within legal issues, have similar valuation
"problems." 80
After deciding that the advanced degree would be treated as property
subject to division, the court rejected the method of valuation adopted by
Inman and Horstmann, and found that the value of the degree should be
determined by the future earnings it would generate.81 The court stated
that the cost approach "would provide [the non-degree-holding spouse]
no realization of [his or] her expectation of economic benefit from the
career for which the education laid the foundation."8 12 The court also
rejected the notion of compensation through alimony, stating that the
considerations for alimony are different from those of property division
and that alimony can be terminated on remarriage. The Woodworth
court reasoned that the non-degree-holding spouse should not lose the
This court cannot accept the proposition that an educational degree received by one spouse
while the other spouse contributes financially to the cost of obtaining the degree is, upon a
dissolution of their marriage, marital property.
We do, however, recognize the issue of how to fairly compensate a person who has supported
his or her spouse while the other spouse was in school, when the marriage is dissolved before the
family is able to realize the benefits from the spouse's advanced education ....
If the issue were before this court, we would be constrained to the view that the proper
formula to be followed in placing a value on an educational degree secured by a spouse, to
which the other spouse contributed financially, is to measure the recovery by the amount of
money the non-college going spouse contributed toward living expenses, the amount of money
contributed for educational costs, and the potential for increase in future earning capacity made
possible by the degree, thus not treating the degree as marital property.
Id.
76. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983); O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
77. 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983).
78. Id. at 265, 337 N.W.2d at 336.
79. Id. at 266, 337 N.W.2d at 336.
80. Id. at 266-67, 337 N.W.2d at 336.
81. Id. at 269, 337 N.W.2d at 337.
82. Id. at 268, 337 N.W.2d at 337 (citing Comment, Divorce After Professional School: Educa-
tion and Future Earning Capacity May Be Marital Property, 44 Mo. L. REv. 329, 335 (1979)).
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benefits of the degree simply because he or she remarries. a3 Thus, the
court held that the correct method by which to measure the value of an
advanced degree for equitable distribution purposes would be "to esti-
mate what the person holding the degree is likely to make in the particu-
lar job market and subtract from that what he or she would probably
have earned without the degree."84
The court in Woodworth85 did not answer the argument that, in effect,
it had divided non-marital property when it divided future earnings. In
addition, the court's analogy to valuation problems in personal injury,
worker's compensation, and wrongful death cases failed to recognize
that, in those cases, a fund usually exists to pay any award, even if it is
speculative.
While Woodworth,86 Horstmann,87 Inman,8 and O'Brien,89 appear to
stand for the proposition that an advanced degree should be considered
marital property and a division made as a matter of right, at least one
court has interpreted these cases to hold little more than that a court
may make an equitable award. In Watling v. Watling,90 the Michigan
Court of Appeals refused to follow Woodworth and instead stated that a
court must look at all the facts and decide what is most equitable.91
If Watling92 indicates a trend, Woodworth and its progeny will not re-
ceive a wide following. More likely, courts will adopt the position stated
by Mahoney.
93
VII. A RECOMMENDATION FOR NORTH CAROLINA
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion, dissolution of a marriage
where the major asset is an advanced degree has produced results which
are neither simple nor uniform. Most state statutes do not assist in the
resolution of the issue. Most state statutes simply provide, as does North
Carolina's, that one of the factors to consider in making an equitable
distribution of marital property is the "direct or indirect contribution
made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of the
83. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 267-68, 337 N.W.2d at 336.
84. Id. at 269, 337 N.W.2d at 337 (citing Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Edu-
cation: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 379, 3 82-84
(1980)).
85. 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983).
86. Id.
87. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
88. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979), rev'd, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982).
89. 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
90. 127 Mich. App. 624, 339 N.W.2d 505 (1983).
91. Id. at 625, 339 N.W.2d at 507.
92. Id.
93. 91 NJ. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). But see Krauskopf, supra note 84; Note, Family Law:
Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible As Property Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517
(1981).
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other spouse."19 4 This is only helpful if there is marital property to di-
vide; it does not apply if no marital property has been acquired. Thus,
North Carolina must either categorize the advanced degree as property
subject to the equitable distribution law or find another workable
solution.
A majority of the state courts have held that the advanced degree is
not property subject to division.9" It is unlikely that North Carolina
courts would join the minority and find the degree to be marital prop-
erty, especially in view of the North Carolina position on professional
degrees and licenses.96 Thus, if public policy in North Carolina favors
compensation upon divorce for a non-degree spouse, such compensation
must be authorized either by legislation or by the state supreme court's
exercise of its equity powers.
Rather than a series of different and conflicting district court decisions
and the accompanying uncertainty those decisions present to attorneys
and judges, it is suggested that the best course for North Carolina is to
amend its equitable distribution act. North Carolina should adopt the
current trend to allow the non-degree spouse some recovery for his or her
contribution to the education of the degree-earning spouse. As the court
stated in Mahoney, "[t]he unredressed sacrifices-loss of support and re-
duction of the standard of living--coupled with the unfairness attendant
upon the defeat of the supporting spouse's shared expectation of future
advantages, further justify a remedial reward."97
The first issue to resolve is what form the remedial award should take.
There are inherent disadvantages to using alimony or reimbursement ali-
mony as the vehicle for recovery. Alimony awards terminate on remar-
riage, and in North Carolina do not apply to all divorces.98 The concept
of reimbursement alimony is not widely accepted, and even states which
have adopted the concept have not addressed all of the ramifications of
such an award.99 The easiest and most practical type of award would be
a money judgment not limited to existing property to the non-degree-
earning spouse. This is the approach taken in Indiana."°
The final question is how to value the award. Should North Carolina
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (1984).
95. Eg., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2).
97. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1984). See also 1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW
§ 34 (4th ed. 1979).
99. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
100. When the court finds there is little or no marital property, it may award either spouse a
money judgment not limited to the existing property. However, this award may be made only for
the financial contribution of one spouse toward tuition, books, and laboratory fees for the higher
education of the other spouse. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (Burns 1980).
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follow Woodworth,' and base the award on future earnings, or should it
follow Indiana"0 2 and Mahoney"0 3 and base the award on the amount of
the financial contribution of the non-degree-earning spouse to the degree?
An award based on potential future earnings is too speculative. This is
especially true where the court must anticipate a person's success in a
given field. The analogies drawn by the court in Woodworth,"° to work-
men's compensation and personal injury awards ignore the fact that
many of these awards are paid out of a fund. For example, if goodwill is
valued at a certain sum, the business may be sold to pay the award; if an
award is based on projected future earnings in a wrongful death action,
there is usually an insurance policy to pay the judgment. In making an
award based on the future earnings of a degree holder, there is no ex-
isting fund from which to pay the award. An award based on future
earnings involves speculation and makes an award of property not ac-
quired during marriage.'1 5 For these reasons, North Carolina should
adopt the cost approach to valuing the award.
North Carolina should amend its equitable distribution statute to al-
low a court, in cases where little or no marital property is found, to
render a money judgment, not limited to present property, in favor of the
non-degree-earning spouse. The award should be limited to the financial
contribution that spouse made toward the education of the degree-earn-
ing spouse."0 6 It should include living expenses, tuition, books, fees,
school travel, and any other related costs. The court should also be em-
powered to secure such a judgment with a lien on separate property of
the degree-earning spouse. Such an amendment would equitably resolve
the dilemma, and would bring a degree of certainty to an area wrought
with confusion and unfairness. Its adoption would place North Carolina
in an intellectually leading position with regard to this difficult problem.
101. 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983).
102. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (Burns 1980).
103. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
104. 126 Mich. App. at 266-67, 337 N.W.2d at 336.
105. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
106. See Moore, Should a Professional Degree Be Considered a Marital Asset Upon Divorce?, 15
AKRON L. REv. 543 (1982). Cf. Comment, The Professional Degree As Marital Property Under
North Carolina's Equitable Distribution Statute, 6 CAMPBELL L. Rlv. 101, 124(1984) (cost-recovery
approach whereby "contributing spouse" awarded "a return on the investment to the extent of one-
half of the cost of living... during the school years, plus whatever sum has been expended for
tuition, books and other costs of attaining the degree .... ") Id.
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